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Spies, stonework, and the suuq: Somali nationalism and the narrative 
politics of pro-Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin online propaganda  
 
Since 2013, media affiliates of Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin (HSM) have 
been producing and disseminating online documentary-style videos presenting 
daily life in areas of south-central Somalia under the militant group‟s control. In 
the context of their wider jihad waged against foreign occupiers and an 
“apostate” Federal Government, these videos feature narratives of nationalist 
economic self-determination as alternatives to aid dependence and the allegedly 
nefarious interference of external powers in Somalia. This paper analyses the 
iconography of these videos in the context of the „narrative politics‟ of a 
fragmented modern Somalia. If HSM has, at times, been characterised by a 
broad ideological divide between factions with an „internationalist‟ jihadi 
outlook and those with a more pragmatic „nationalist' worldview, then the 
discourses of this latter faction require detailed analysis not only for a clearer 
understanding of the internal dynamics of the HSM insurgency but also in 
regards to the wider role of narratives of Somali ethno-nationalism in ongoing 
processes of state reconfiguration. The paper argues that although HSM no 
longer benefits from the popular nationalist kudos it previously enjoyed in its 
resistance to the Ethiopian invasion of 2006, it nonetheless operates in a 
discursive battlefield where narratives around malign foreign intervention - 
based on exploitation of socio-political divisions of society and the dependence 
brought by external humanitarian aid - transcend the movement itself and find 
expression in the wider public spheres of news media and popular commentary. 
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Introduction  
Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin (‗Al Shabaab‘1, hereafter HSM) operates as a 
primary belligerent at war with governmental and international forces in Somalia. In the 
terminology of one of these parties, the United Nations, it acts as a ―spoiler‖ towards 
multilateral military and political efforts to reconfigure and reconstruct the Somali 
nation state
2
. This takfiri jihadi or militant salafi
3
 Islamist organisation is distinct from 
the numerous domestic armed actors in Somalia in that it has maintained a broader 
operational structure (both in terms of territorial presence and operation, as well as 
relatively diverse clan makeup of senior leadership and ideologues
4
) and has thus been 
in a position to espouse a distinctive narrative of the ongoing conflict in local, national 
and global terms.  
 In south-central Somalia, where state structures have been absent for a quarter of 
a century, the re-emergence of governance and the ongoing reconfiguration of the 
Somali state inevitably involves discursive contestation over political legitimacy and 
ideological orientation. This propaganda war continues in a context of extreme political 
and social fragmentation where very little - in terms of the mechanisms or legitimacy of 
power - can be taken for granted. HSM and affiliated propagandists operate on this 
battlefield to promote an all-encompassing lebenswelt/lifeworld narrative
5
 legitimating 
their armed struggle against the ―infidels/unbelievers‖ (gaal) and their ―apostate 
stooges‖ (murtad/dabadhilif). This operates both in terms of the global jihad of 
transnational Islamist militancy and also through vocabularies of Somali nationalism 
and anti-colonialism, drawing on assumptions of shared cultural, religious and political 
identity.  
The pro-HSM narrative is just one of numerous different interpretations of 
processes of state reconfiguration active in the dynamic discursive arena that is the 
modern Somali ‗public sphere‘. My focus on the narrative politics6 of insurgency and 
counter-insurgency emphasises the diverse circuits of political communication which 
feed into and help construct popular imaginations and understandings of conflict and 
political change. Demonstrations of strength and intent, and the winning ‗hearts and 
minds‘ are as much priorities for HSM as they are for a host of local, regional and 
international actors including humanitarian organisations, United Nations agencies, 
African Union forces and domestic political actors. ‗Ordinary‘ Somalis, inside the 
country and in the diaspora engage this narrative politics via ‗social‘ and news media, 
and seek to foreground discourses of ―Somalia Rising‖ or respond creatively to the 
violence of HSM itself
7
. At the other end of this info-wars spectrum, even the United 
States‘ Department of Defence has been, until recently, maintaining a Somali-language 
news website in order to promote certain perspectives (or ‗moderate‘ voices) on the 
reconstruction of the Somali state, clearly indicative of the importance of electronic 
media in the context of ongoing conflict
8
.   
Most recent literature on HSM communications has focused on its 
internationalist orientation and its status as regional affiliate of Al Qaeda, often 
emphasising the role of foreign fighters or the agency of Somali-diaspora recruits either 
in Somalia itself or in communities in the West
9
. While such accounts yield important 
insight into the transnational dynamics of modern Islamist militancy, much less 
attention is given to the local narratives of conflict which propelled HSM from being 
one radical splinter of the broader Islamic Courts Union (Midowga Maxkamadaha 
Islaamiga) to the bureaucratic, relatively efficient and cross-clan administration of large 
parts of Southern Somalia between 2006 and 2010.   
While HSM‘s early ‗nationalist‘ legitimacy – forged in their resistance against 
the (Western-backed) Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 - has been noted by the 
relatively few scholars who have critically examined the movement as an administrative 
entity
10
, I argue that there remains considerable scope for interrogation of the actual 
forms of these Somali ethno-nationalist discourses in the wider context of statelessness, 
political reconfiguration and socio-religious change in Somalia. This paper contends 
that Somali language propaganda of HSM affiliates and sympathisers explicitly presents 
‗Somali‘ ethno-nationalist and religio-cultural discourses, relevant to wider popular 
local perceptions of the conflict and political reconfiguration across Somalia. While 
HSM may have exhausted its popular political capital due to its battlefield tactics, 
elements of their conflict narrative may continue to chime with popular critiques in the 
wider Somali public sphere against political elites beholden to foreign security agendas, 
finance and ideology, and the ultimate ‗neo-colonial‘ division of the Somali Ummah 
(Ummadda Soomaaliyeed)
11
. 
This paper does not endeavour to humanize or provide a platform for ideologues 
who hope to legitimize violence (which the writer has witnessed first-hand) against 
civilians. Instead, there is an attempt to understand how tropes of ‗cultural‘ ethno-
nationalism in this material are intended to ‗work‘ vis-á-vis an audience which has 
experienced a generation of statelessness, persistent (if inconsistent) foreign 
intervention, and socio-religious change. The paper attempts to steer clear of prior 
assumptions of some essentialised or monolithic notion of ‗Somali‘ culture or identity, 
but instead engages with how vocabularies of ‗tradition‘ are operationalised in 
propaganda texts themselves.  
      
Critical discourse analysis and text selection 
This paper interrogates the cultural, religious and historical narratives which are 
wrapped up in the content of pro-HSM propaganda videos – often prosaic, domestic or 
idyllic themes seemingly far removed from the violence of much of the Islamist 
propaganda which receives greater scholarly or journalistic attention. Here I apply 
Alshaer‘s ―culture of communications‖ methodology as utilised in his analysis of 
media/literary products of Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, another 
movement whose communication strategy employs tropes of nationalist-historical 
struggle as well as themes of divinely sanctioned politico-religious governance
12
. 
Building on Said‘s notions of the inseparability of language and culture13 and a 
Saussurian conception of language as sign (acoustic ‗image‘ as signifier and the 
signified ‗concept‘14), this culture of communications ―allows the recipients of 
communicative practices...to recognize socio-political plurality and positionality within 
societies as well as the shared linguistic and cultural characteristics that a socio-
linguistic community shares and reacts to.‖15 This ‗cultural‘ framing of the 
methodology speaks to a core feature of critical discourse analysis approaches: the 
treatment of language as a social practice in itself and an emphasis the dialectical 
relationship existing between a context and a ―discursive event‖ - in other words, that 
they mutually condition and are conditioned by each other
16
. 
My own selection of ―texts‖ is based on professional and research experience in 
the Somali media environment since 2012 and my wider PhD research focuses on the 
relationship between a transnational Somali-language public sphere of news media and 
the continuing deployment of ethno-nationalist discourses. As such, I identify in the 
analysis narrative overlaps between these pro-HSM propaganda videos and material in 
the wider media environment across Somalia. The paper primarily engages with three 
videos from the same media network (Al Furqaan media), which, although of different 
lengths, all share numerous stylistic features.  The analysis moves between a fine-
grained examination of particular elements of the discourses and an attempt to situate 
the recurring themes of the material in the broader contexts of both the struggle for the 
reconfiguration of the Somali state and wider debates in the Somali-language public 
sphere.  
These videos are worthy of attention, I argue, for three reasons. Firstly, this type 
of material has received little prior scholarly attention in the Somali context in 
comparison to ‗official‘ HSM media focusing on the battlefield itself. Secondly, this 
particular producer (Al Furqaan) continues to release slick propaganda material that 
directly relates to dynamic battlefield developments in southern Somalia – indeed, their 
most recent video was released in December 2015 and purported to show the town of 
Janaale ―recovering‖ in the aftermath of its recapture by HSM from African Union 
forces
17
. Finally - and while this lies beyond the scope of this paper – there is significant 
analytical scope for the comparison of this material with other ‗positive‘ Jihadi 
propaganda from other contexts, particularly the media savvy militants of the so-called 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, whose huge output on the alleged social benefits of 
Islamist state-building goes far beyond the gruesome execution or battlefield themes 
they are most commonly associated with.      
Before embarking on analysis of these texts themselves, the paper first gives an 
overview of the various conflict dynamics which characterise state reconfiguration in 
south-central Somalia today and provides a condensed contextualisation of Islamist 
mobilisation in modern Somali political history. This is followed by an examination of 
the particular Somali media environment in which these texts operate. The direct textual 
analysis is followed by reflection on the interplay between narratives of 
internationalised and regional militancy, and highly localised dynamics of political 
organisation and mobilisation.  
Conflict and political reconfiguration in modern south-central Somalia 
Despite the installation of a new and internationally-recognised Somali Federal 
Government (SFG) in 2012 under the presidency of Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud, and the 
gradual expansion of military control by government forces and the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) over territory once controlled by HSM, the wider 
Somali political environment remains highly fragmented. Political control by the SFG 
of areas outside of Muqdisho (Mogadishu) remains tenuous, and an insurgency/counter-
insurgency conflict is ongoing in several regions.  Although HSM has been on the back 
foot since 2010/11 with the loss of territory it controlled in Muqdisho (and then from 
2012 with the progressive fall of towns from Kismaayo and Baraawe on the coast, 
through to inland urban footholds in Gedo and Bay regions in 2015) it still retains an 
amorphous presence in the south central hinterlands, frequently demonstrating the 
capacity to move back into previously ‗liberated‘ areas as SFG and AMISOM forces 
move on. This fluidity means that maps of military/political control of south-central 
Somali - however up to date - invariably fail to capture the complexity of the reality on 
the ground and the situation is often better conceptualised as a shifting patchwork of 
force movement and nominal control from various actors. These include SFG or SFG-
aligned military units; the forces of embryonic regional administrations (such as the 
Interim Jubbaland Administration or the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaac forces); local clan-
based militias (where these are actually distinguishable from the previous two types of 
actors); AMISOM contingents who vary in terms of regional zones of operation, 
capacity and interests; and HSM itself.  
The targeted killing by US drone strike of HSM leader Axmed Cabdi Godane 
(nom de guerre Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr) in September 2014 was anticipated from some 
quarters to accelerate the further degradation of the organisation. The group had been 
beset by worsening internal divisions between various factions loosely representing 
nationalist versus ‗internationalist‘ strategic priorities, foreign/local fighter contestation, 
and groups or individuals disenchanted with the centralisation of control by Godane - 
itself bringing criticism from senior Al Qaeda figures to which the group had formally 
affiliated with from 2012
18
. Although these schisms culminated in the violent deaths of 
several high profile figures, from the young American jihadi Omar Shafik Hammami 
(nom de guerre Abu Mansur Al Amriki) to the veteran Somali Islamist and one-time 
close associate of Godane, Ibraahim Xaaji Jaamac Meecaad ‗Al Afghani‘, HSM 
nonetheless retained a capacity for mounting ‗complex‘ attacks on a variety of 
governmental, military and civilian targets in Muqdisho. Recently, HSM‘s military 
tactics have moved beyond asymmetrical harrying of AMISOM forces to direct 
engagement with selected outposts. Routs of Burundian and Kenyan bases in June 2015 
and January 2016 have provided a wealth of official propaganda material for the group. 
The momentum of AMISOM/SFG advances against HSM and their ability to 
effectively hold captured territory are influenced by wider political turbulence (such as 
the turnover of three Prime Ministers in two years since 2012) and difficulties of 
reconfiguring regional control along Federal lines
19
. Here it is important to consider the 
varying degrees of consolidation of administrations established for ‗Jubaland‘ centred 
around Kismaayo, the ‗South West State‘ around Baydhabo, and the more recent 
intrigues and conflict involved in getting a ‗Central State‘ in Galgaduud and Mudug off 
the ground. This overview of the political/military situation highlights the peculiar and 
messy reality of power on the ground in south-central Somalia, where political 
reconfiguration continues alongside both insurgency/counterinsurgency in areas 
nominally controlled by SFG/AMISOM forces, and the advances of these military 
assets into areas still under the black flag of HSM. 
 
Islamist mobilisation in Somalia 
Modern Somali Islamism can primarily be traced to the emergence of groups such as Al 
Ittixaad Al Islaam, mobilised in opposition to the confrontational secularism of Siyaad 
Bare‘s military regime through the 1970s and 1980s. Coinciding with increased global 
expression of political Islamist agency, the growing influence of Salafi or Wahabi 
inspired Sunni doctrines
20
, and Somali economic migration to the Gulf States, the 
development of anti-regime Islamist organisation would come to play a political and 
social role in the aftermath of state collapse in 1991.  
Although the fall of Bare‘s regime was brought about by the operations of 
regional clan-based militias through the 1980s (including the Somali National 
Movement in what would become Somaliland in the north-west; the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front in what is now Puntland in the north-east, and the United Somali 
Congress who took Muqdisho from the central regions and swept through the south), 
Islamist mobilisation and rhetoric remained an undercurrent within attempts to pull the 
country out of the conflict that followed state collapse in 1991. The extent to which 
Islamist organisations such as Al Ittixaad were active and internationally-linked during 
this period is debatable, although modern jihadis are often eager to link themselves with 
this historical context - for example, in regard to the murder of the Bishop of Muqdisho, 
or the infamous Black Hawk Down incident during the United States‘ and United 
Nations‘ early engagement with post-state collapse Somalia21.  
Space precludes a full overview of the complex historical development of the 
regionally divided Somali Islamist movements during the chaotic period of 1990s‘ 
‗warlord‘ politics. However, it is necessary to reference certain important milestones 
including the confrontation between Al Ittixaad and the SSDF in the North East leading 
to their expulsion from the strategic port city of Bosaaso in 1992, and their subsequent 
entrenchment in the South in Gedo region, eventually prompting Ethiopian military 
incursions from 1996
22
. Meanwhile, a stateless and divided Muqdisho experienced 
different stages of Islamist judicial development, eventually culminating in the 
emergence of the Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga (Union of Islamic Courts) that 
would expand its authority into larger areas of Southern Somalia before its overthrow in 
the Ethiopian invasion of 2006
23
. It was from this point that HSM (hitherto an armed 
radical faction of the broader Courts movement) asserted itself as the primary resistor 
against what was portrayed as brutal Ethiopian aggression, and would subsequently 
come to establish itself as an administrative body across the majority of the Southern 
Somali regions during what Hansen describes as its ―Golden Age‖ of governance and 
territorial control around 2009/2010
24
.  
These different periods of Islamist mobilisation and administrative development 
in the post 1991-era corresponded with and conditioned wider trends of socio-religious 
change visible particularly in urban Somalia. Increased emphasis on public piety, 
orthodox critiques of ‗traditional‘ socio-religious practices and a visible trend of cultural 
orientation towards the Arab world are all apparent features of religious expression in 
modern Somali urban communities
25
. The popular conception that ―most Somalis are 
Sufis‖26 and are thus likely to automatically reject or resist the governance or judicial 
practices of a salafi Sunni administration is an over-simplification of a socio-religious 
context which has changed enormously in the decades following state-collapse. 
Insecurity has created conditions where the perceived impartial and firm 
implementation of Shariah has, at times, been welcomed as a remedy by different social 
groups who make careful calculations of the tradeoffs between individual liberty and 
the security gains of jihadi rule.    
This is not to say that religio-political contestation along salafi/sufi lines does 
not exist. The militant „sufi‟ agency of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaac against HSM may 
be expressed in these terms, although the extent to which this constitutes a purely 
ideological contest - as opposed to completing clan interests in the Central Regions - is 
beyond the scope of this paper
27
. However, in the wider discursive battlefield, popular 
debates seem to have largely shifted beyond what constitute ‗traditional‘ or ‗Somali‘ 
forms of Islam. Indeed, the propaganda analysed below makes no mention of competing 
interpretations of Islam (whether ‗traditional‘, ‗Somali‘ or otherwise) and focuses 
instead on clear distinctions between a Sunni Ummadda Soomaaliyeed and those who 
are ―apostate‖ by their association with a government that cooperates with the infidels. 
This formulation by omission is in itself a highly political act - essentially erasing 
debate on alternative conceptions of appropriate religious practice in the Somali context 
- and yet this type of framing of the religious/ideological field is characteristic not just 
of HSM propaganda but also other debates playing out in the Somali public sphere.  
The space for public religious debate has been greatly constricted not only by 
the threat of HSM retaliations but also wider patterns of increased doctrinal orthodoxy 
and social conservatism evident in urban centres across Somalia
28
. In discussion over 
the complexities of Islam and social change in Somalia one must remember that this is a 
context where various political Islamist factions (themselves often the products of the 
same educational, and socialisation processes which influenced the emergence of HSM) 
are on the ascendancy in government and represent the future of Somalia as a Sunni 
Islamic state
29
. In many respects, the elite political arena of Muqdisho is characterised 
both by clan/regional competition and the factionalism of political Islamists, organised 
around semi-institutionalised cliques such as Dam al Jadiid, the group which is 
popularly perceived to dominate the current presidency and which itself emerged as a 
splinter group of the Somalia‘s Muslim Brotherhood-orientated Al Islaax movement.  
Menkhaus
30
 has described ‗Somali‘ Islam as the ―veil lightly worn‖ and 
emphasised the continued primacy of xeer (customary law) over Shariah, and, a decade 
later, while recognizing socio-religious changes, Anderson follows this logic to assert 
that HSM‘s temporary ascendency would be ―difficult to sustain [as] previous 
experience in Somalia indicates that Islamic fundamentalism will dissipate again when 
the threat of foreign invasion subsides‖31. HSM‘s period of ―ascendency‖ is, sure 
enough, over. However, I argue that critiques and fears of persistent (or permanent) 
foreign occupation and its affect on the civilian population remain highly salient 
throughout the public spheres of media debate in Southern Somalia
32
. Occupation 
continues alongside the political reconfiguration of the Federalisation of Somalia and 
local commentators continue to decry the varying interests of foreign forces. These 
discourses range from narratives and conspiracy theories emphasising the trans-
historical dominance of the Ethiopian state over the Somali territory, the current Kenyan 
agenda in South, or the interests of other AMISOM contingents content to take their 
African Union salaries leaving them no good reason to end the conflict and leave 
Somali soil. In a context of media fragmentation and intense suspicion towards outside 
agendas, rumours and misinformation can hold great currency. This is a fact not lost on 
propagandists, including those who support HSM. 
       
The media battlefield 
The complexities of the political-military context are mirrored in the fragmentary nature 
of the media environment in Somalia. Apart from several large, externally-based Somali 
language broadcasters (such as the BBC‘s Somali Service and Voice of America on the 
radio, and Universal TV), the news-media market is characterised by multiple radio 
stations and websites usually focused in and around specific areas or cities. State control 
of media is limited, particularly in South-Central Somalia, and state or state-affiliated 
broadcasters (such as Somali National TV or Radio Mogadishu) have no monopoly over 
broadcasting to shape a unified political narrative
33
. Although radio remains the primary 
mode of news media transmission across the country, levels of internet connectivity are 
increasing rapidly especially in urban areas, and this includes the use of mobile internet 
technologies. Indeed, in the absence of libraries and state archives the internet itself is 
becoming the primary repository of Somali media and cultural production as virtually 
all content (radio broadcasts, television programmes, print news) finds its way online to 
become accessible for audiences elsewhere in Somalia and in the large and influential 
global Somali diaspora
34
.  
Media products promoting the HSM agenda can be divided into two broad and 
potentially overlapping categories: ‗official‘ HSM communication epitomised by the 
organisation‘s Al Kataib media unit; and the material produced by various affiliated 
networks such as Al Furqaan Radio/Media, or websites such as somalimemo.com or 
calamada.com. Differentiating between affiliation and ownership with/by HSM is rarely 
straightforward in the fluid battlefield and media environment, and since 2010 Radio Al 
Furqaan‘s headquarters has shifted from one HSM-controlled location to the next as the 
group has lost control of various urban strongholds. While this indicates that Al Furqaan 
is a ‗Shabaab‘ station, it nevertheless bills itself as an ―independent‖ media network, 
and this influences the type and tone of the propaganda it releases.    
  Al Kataib‘s ‗official‘ HSM output is largely in Arabic or English and focuses 
mainly on the on the ongoing conflict itself, the role of fighters and the various 
operations carried out in the name of HSM‘s jihad both in Somalia and in neighbouring 
countries such as Kenya. This material appears to primarily target audiences in the 
Arabic speaking world and in the West, and seeks to either promote HSM as a credible 
and effective transnational Jihadi actor (as Al Qaeda‘s affiliate in East Africa35) or as a 
vehicle to directly address Governments to both threaten attacks and attract potential 
foreign fighters (whether of Somali ethnic origin or not) to their struggle in East 
Africa
36
. Capable cameramen are evidently embedded in HSM units for certain high-
profile attacks and the (edited, captioned and often highly graphic) material they 
produce is picked up not only by pro-jihadi websites but also finds its way into more 
‗mainstream‘ Somali news media as documentation of ongoing conflict37.  
The media production of Al Furqaan, on the other hand, tends to be released 
exclusively in Somali and, whilst referencing the ongoing conflict, focuses more on the 
alleged economic, social, political and developmental benefits of HSM rule through 
their implementation of strict Islamic Law (Shariah). The videos analysed in this paper 
are taken from a much wider Al Furqaan output, and have all been distributed 
electronically, primarily through the Youtube platform. As the videos only reference the 
conflict indirectly they have so far escaped Youtube censors who typically remove other 
more explicitly violent jihadist material. The four videos analysed in this paper had (as 
of January 2016) a combined total of around 97,000 views. Whilst this figure – in terms 
of global ‗viral‘ online video – is hardly staggering, it does indicate that a Somali 
speaking audience exists for the material and these figures do not include direct viewing 
through other websites.  
Attempting to identify the target or actual audience of such material is a difficult 
task for the researcher. Obviously, this material is aimed at a Somali-speaking audience 
located in Somalia, in the Somali-speaking territories of the Horn, or in wider diaspora 
communities. This paper assumes that the audience in Somalia is primarily situated in 
urban areas where internet access is relatively fast and affordable, and is also relatively 
young, based on the tone of the material and the apparently young age of many of the 
journalists. Whilst it is clear that the content has been filmed on the ground in south-
central Somalia it is possible that post-production may have been undertaken outside of 
Somalia, as in other contexts of jihadi media production
38
. Regardless of the potentially 
transnational character of this media production and consumption (true of online Somali 
news media in general), it is clear that the material is engaging with a particular 
narrative of life and conflict on the ground in Somalia. Important for this analysis is the 
way in which these ‗locally‘ produced and consumed texts present the interplay 
between meta-narratives of global or transnational militant Islamist struggle and micro-
level religious or cultural politics of everyday life in south central Somalia. 
Spies, stonework and the suuq 
The videos uploaded by Al Furqaan onto their Youtube channel from late 2013 were 
focused primarily on daily life and ‗development‘ in areas still under the control of 
HSM. The videos‘ locations (Ceel Buur in Galgaduud Region, Baraawe and Buulo 
Mareer in Lower Shabelle Region) were all captured by AMISOM/SFG forces in 2014, 
while Lower Juba remains largely under HSM control at the time of writing. In each 
case, and characteristic of HSM‘s battlefield tactics, the towns were ceded to the 
advancing forces without significant urban resistance. HSM forces melted away into the 
hinterland to harry the occupying forces and disrupt supply lines both for the new 
occupiers and the remaining civilian populations. Foreseeing losses of territory that year 
may have spurred HSM and affiliated media organisations to produce this wave of 
material to serve as propaganda for their period of administration. This would invite 
comparisons between the economic or humanitarian conditions of these towns before 
and after the SFG takeovers; conditions which would be inevitably worsened by the 
ongoing conflict, HSM‘s tactic of economic blockade, and the SFG‘s inability to extend 
the provision of basic services to local populations in the wake of its territorial 
advances. 
 On the surface, Al Furqaan‘s film “How the stone stoves of Ceel Buur are 
made” is a mundane 11 minute documentary about traditional stone work and trade in 
this town in Galgaduud in central Somalia
39
. However, read in the context of HSM 
narratives engaging tropes of Islamic and Somali ethno-nationalist identity, the video 
serves as a sophisticated piece of propaganda designed to frame the Somali state (and 
battles for it) in a way that glorifies and empowers HSM militancy and governance. The 
video begins (like all of those analysed here) with Arabic script and a voiceover 
announcing ―In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, Most Merciful‖. This is followed 
by the Somali (latin script) name of Al Furqaan Broadcasting, their website emerging in 
explosive graphics; sparks and flames evoking divine or supernatural power.  The film 
opens with panoramic shots of the town at sunrise and the male voiceover - strong-
voiced but calm and measured in tone, speaking clearly to his audience - begins by 
describing the town‘s long history in the central regions of Somalia. He emphasises that 
it was previously invaded by Ethiopian Forces, although the population remained. The 
inclusion of a caption naming the journalist is important and characteristic of all these 
films in that it attempts to present an image to the viewer of an independent media 
organisation providing objective reportage from areas under the control of HSM, and 
distinguishes such products from the official communications of HSM itself.  
 The introduction continues with another description of Ceel Buur as an ancient 
town blessed with natural resources; famous in Somalia and abroad for the stone stoves 
(burjiko) that are produced there. Going in search of those with the skills to make these 
stoves the journalist (never pictured in the film) then interviews a craftsman who 
discusses the security situation under the area control of the ―Mujaahidiin” (he gives a 
positive assessment, of course) and talks about his tools and process of work. This is 
followed by various shots of the digging of holes for the excavation of the stone, its 
extraction and a continuous description of the process and the various people involved. 
The journalist maintains the didactic tone of an educator, instructing viewers on a 
traditional handicraft.      
 Another interview with a different carver reveals perspectives on the geographic 
location and directions of the trade, themselves of political significance. Discussing the 
export of the stoves, the craftsman states that they are taken to places in ―this land‖ 
(dhulkan) such as ―Somaliland, Puntland, Djibouti, Zone 5, and then also Ethiopia and 
across the sea‖. Here the administrations inside what is formally recognised as 
‗Somalia‘ - the secessionist Somaliland and the autonomous but non-secessionist 
Puntland – are imagined as part of the Somali territory, but so too is the nation state of 
Djibouti and Zone 5 (the administrative name for Ethiopia‘s ethnically Somali-
dominated territory, sometimes known by the name deriving from the predominant clan 
there, the Ogaden). The carver‘s subsequent addition of ―Ethiopia‖ and his manner of 
speaking then situates it as a different or separate place.  
 Regardless of whether or not the interviewee was coached or coerced into this 
manner of speech (perhaps unlikely given the relatively natural way goes about 
answering the rather mundane questions), this ordering of the geography of the Somali 
lands is significant in that it correlates with the historical notion of the ‗Greater 
Somalia‘ divided up by the colonialists and packaged of to hostile non-Somali 
neighbours such as Ethiopia
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. This idea, integral to the identity of the post-colonial 
Somali state – from the symbolic five points of the star on the Somali flag representing 
the five ‗Somali‘ territories of the Horn, to the war fought against Ethiopia in 1977 for 
control of one of those territories – has been rebooted in the rise of Islamist political and 
military agitation, emphasising the religious solidarity of the Ummadda Soomaaliyeed 
on top of ethnic, linguistic or cultural linkage between the territories. The words of this 
stone carver under the tree in Ceel Buur constitute either a subtly crafted piece of 
political propaganda, or simply represent wider popular perceptions of the geographical 
status of Somali territories within a politically divided Horn. That the administrations of 
Somaliland or Puntland are discursively equated with the political arrangements of 
Djibouti or Zone 5 in Ethiopia, is of significance for the way in which Somali ‗states‘ 
are imagined and reproduced, and the types of rhetoric and agency which are fashioned 
around them.    
 The video concludes with footage of the craftsmen and traders preparing and 
coming together for the Maqrib (sunset) prayer. The narrator intones that the people of 
Ceel Buur have found peace with implementation of the Shariah and that as producers 
and tradesmen they come together to pray in the same place. The imagery is that of a 
rural, productive and religious idyll situated firmly in a context of ‗traditional‘ and 
‗Somali‘ economic activity.  
Al Furqaan‘s more substantial documentary “Development of the society after 
the deception of the agencies”41 presents a critique of humanitarian actors in relation to 
Somali economic self-sufficiency and food security. Uploaded onto Youtube in 
December 2013, the film opens by introducing its location (Jamaame and Kamsuuma 
districts in Lower Juba region) and individuals (such as community spokesmen) who 
will be interviewed by the Al Furqaan journalist. That the journalist is presented as an 
outsider implies an objectivity in this reporting by an ―independent‖ news agency. The 
―ease‖ of the journey is emphasised, a factor intended to resonate with people in 
different parts of south-central Somalia where movement between districts is hampered 
by the ubiquitous checkpoints of Government (SFG) forces, pro-SFG and/or clan-based 
local militias, and HSM itself.   
The film situates its narrative of ―development‖ in the Juba regions in the 
context of a wider conflict being fought over Somalia and its resources. The narrator 
(over footage of AMISOM troops arriving in Muqdisho) describes how the ―invasion‖ 
of Somalia has been ongoing for a long time and is a ―multifaceted‖ campaign. One of 
these ―faces‖ relates to control of agricultural production and the impoverishment of 
Somalis, which itself leads to the dangerous emigration (tahriib) of Somalis to Europe 
or dependence on handouts from the forces which have taken control of the country. 
The ―colonial‖ campaign is described as involving ―warfare of the mind‖; psychological 
tactics to promote the image of poverty in a country that is actually rich in natural 
resources.  
This sequence features footage of communications equipment and meetings 
chaired by white men in suits - actually the UN Special Representative for Somalia, 
although the imagery implies military intelligence and planning
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. The visual linkage 
between communications technology and espionage is significant in the wider context 
of jihadi media in Somalia. Narratives referencing Western surveillance, wikileaks‟ 
revelations, and the hacking of electronic communications are commonly deployed, 
particularly in discussions of drone strikes and the use by foreign intelligence agencies 
of locals as spies. This, along with moral injunctions against young peoples‘ time-
wasting online (the irony of HSM‘s electronic jihad notwithstanding) has served as 
justification for sporadic banning of mobile internet, and the public execution of alleged 
spies is a common and publicised occurrence in towns under the group‘s control.   
The narrator contextualises the film‘s subsequent content by declaring that 
although the ―the white or black unbeliever‖ has succeeded in these objectives in the 
areas they have captured, there remain other parts of the country under the control of the 
Islamic administration of HSM that are ―free‖ and in which agricultural production can 
flourish. Administrative governance is equated with rule by Islamic law as a means to 
arbitrate impartially in clan-based disputes, the result of which – as emphasised in this 
particular video – is the improvement of security in the region. The benefits of security 
(resolution of conflicts through the implementation of Islamic law and the removal of 
obstacles to movement such as checkpoints and extortion from pro-government or SFG 
militias) are frequently cited by subsequent interviewees in the film as the primary 
reason that agricultural production and trade has flourished under HSM rule.  
The film progresses through different locations- from the fields to the market 
(suuq) where an idealised image of bountiful domestic production in conditions of 
peace, security and religious observance is presented. From early on, the position of 
international humanitarian ―agencies‖ is implied and then linked with the wider 
narrative of foreign espionage and the invasion of Somalia. The title of the film plays on 
the ambiguity of the term ―agencies‖ (which exists in both Somali and English) and 
blurs the distinctions between ‗humanitarian‘, ‗security‘ or ‗intelligence‘ to the point 
where the viewer is meant to believe these are one in the same. The implication here is 
that humanitarian agencies form a part of the grand neo-colonial structure of regional 
and Western military powers (the former such as historic Christian enemies such as 
Ethiopia and Kenya being utilised by the latter, dominated by the United States) who 
are backing an ―apostate‖ or ―stooge‖ government in Muqdisho in an effort to de-
Islamise, depopulate and then exploit Somalia. Aid itself is portrayed as weapon which 
promotes dependence and a mindset of poverty which enslaves its victims or drives 
them out of Somalia.  
As the film progresses this narrative is reinforced with more specific charges 
levelled against these foreign agendas. Firstly, the actions of the HSM administration to 
reinforce flood barriers on the Juba River to prevent flooding are compared to the lack 
of such measures in Government-controlled areas where, theoretically, international 
humanitarian actors are able to operate. Infrastructure development by the 
administration, such as road building/repair and irrigation, is emphasised with the 
implication that such work to benefit the potential self-sufficiency of Somali production 
is not a priority for the ―agencies‖.  
The action then moves again to the suuq where the narrator describes his 
conversations with traders who tell him that local agricultural production has increased 
since the banning by HSM of the World Food Program (the only agency specifically 
mentioned in the film) which was importing food aid. Here the emphasis is on the 
production of local foodstuffs such as sorghum, maize, sesame and beans, in contrast to 
imported staples of rice and pasta which are prevalent and popular across Somalia. One 
trader describes how food aid ―broke‖ the market for local produce and once again the 
narrative of manufactured dependence on imports is reinforced. Footage of busy 
markets where men and women buy and sell fruit and vegetables exemplifies not only 
an idea of prosperity but of healthy-living based on local produce. Here interviewees 
extol the virtues of local fruit juice over the imported soft drinks which are full of 
―chemicals‖. These are discourses of ‗local‘ or ‗organic‘ food production - familiar to 
bourgeois consumers in the west - but situated in a narrative pitting dependence against 
religiously-framed economic nationalism.  
Humanitarian action (or the wider humanitarian situation of Somalia) is a 
recurring theme in other Al Furqaan videos where references are frequently made to the 
dignity and self-sufficiency of the Somali Ummah and contrasting indignities of aid 
dependence. The January 2014 Al Furqaan film “Project for the people breaking the 
fast” ostensibly portrays HSM in the town of Baraawe providing rations to poor 
residents to enable them to break the fast during the holy month of Ramadan
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video highlights discourses around the micro-politics of aid delivery relevant across 
Somalia, particularly in relation to vulnerable or disadvantaged communities. The 
humanitarian problems facing Somalia are presented in the introduction as a product of 
civil unrest and the ongoing conflict, while the Islamic administration undertakes 
ceaseless humanitarian activities in the areas it controls to mitigate the suffering caused. 
The video goes on to present a distribution of basic foodstuffs to men and women 
(queuing separately) in a courtyard, and the project itself is described as being a 
collaboration between the Islamic administration and wealthy locals.  
The narrator goes into detail about the setting of the distribution: the place is 
very ―clean‖ and the people are ―well organised‖; there is no violence or pointing of 
guns as would be found in the places (of aid distribution) controlled by the government 
or regional administration; men and women are separated, as is stipulated by religion, 
and everyone is sitting down ―nicely‖. The narrator notes that before the distribution 
starts, it is common for the people to be addressed and the film then depicts the Wali 
(HSM governor) of the Lower Jubba region visiting and inspecting the site. This is 
followed by interviews with the recipients, male and female, who talk about the quality 
of the goods distributed (emphasis on the fresh meat) and the dignified manner in which 
it is conducted - one respondent compares it favourably with those distributions 
conducted by the ―infidels‖. The film concludes with a description of the end of the 
distribution, clearly emphasising not only the calm organisation of the event but also 
clear ideas of public piety and gender segregation: ―After the distribution, the people 
begin to leave in an orderly fashion. The women go first, the men wait and are not 
intermingled with them.‖ 
These portrayals of aid and nationalistic self-sufficiency ‗work‘ by reproducing 
the security narrative of HSM control over territory in Somalia. Whilst HSM has lost 
both urban territory and a significant degree of public support - in part due to its 
targeted killings of civilians associated with the SFG and collateral civilian casualties in 
its large scale attacks - it is nevertheless important to recall that initial territorial and 
administrative gains made by the group were founded on the premise of security and 
impartial governance by Shariah. It is this narrative which is being re-engaged in the 
propaganda material here: HSM rule means economic opportunity (especially in regard 
to what are presented as quintessentially ‗Somali‘ economic activities), ―dignified‖ and 
religiously-sanctioned charity, and freedom from the abuses committed by SFG-aligned 
or AMISOM forces.   
 
Ethno-nationalism and the global jihad: a contradiction in terms? 
The deployment of particular tropes of ‗Somali‘ ethno-nationalist identity is one part of 
HSM‘s broad, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory communications strategy 
designed to maximise the range of potential sympathetic audiences both inside Somalia 
and abroad. In communications regarding their ―operations‖ in Kenya, their narrative 
speaks both to a ‗Greater Somalia‘ trans-border ethnic Somali community (who are all 
Muslims) and a wider Islamic constituency of Kenyans, not all of whom are necessarily 
Somali. Ambiguities here allow propagandists to play on the history of colonial division 
of Somalia and grievances of the ethnically Somali population of North Eastern Kenya, 
and at the same time position the conflict in religious as opposed to ethnic terms. This 
then encompasses other non-Somali Muslims, particularly along the coast who have 
similarly rooted complaints about ‗Christian‘ Kenyans from the interior and their 
alleged control of land, resources and state institutions. Transnational in message, 
transnational in means, pro-HSM propagandists are not adverse to employing 
international media sources or advocacy group materials to promote their case in this 
regard
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The purported struggle for the ―Global Caliphate‖ and identification with other 
militant Islamist groups (Al Qaeda, for example) jars both practically and ideologically 
with the Somali ethno-nationalist tone of much HSM-affiliated communication, and 
may be indicative of the factional ‗internationalist/nationalist‘ split noted from the 
outset of the paper. However, in the same way that this divide has not seemed to have 
seriously compromised the military operational capacity of the group (particularly the 
highly centralised, secretive and elite Amniyat intelligence and special operations units), 
the discursive contradictions of their wider communications strategy have served not so 
much as a limitation but rather an enabler of ideological projection to wider potential 
constituencies in the region.  
In assessing both the potential appeal of and the apparent paradoxes inherent in 
discourses of nationalist-inspired jihad, it is useful to engage with specific designations 
of ‗Somali‘ culture in the above texts in the context of an Islamist insurgency entwined 
in local (or clan-based) political intrigues. The productive practices presented in the 
films are related to an economic conception of ‗Somali‘ resources and ‗traditional‘ 
practices of both agro-pastoral and pastoral groups. This is important in that it straddles 
different conceptualisations of Somali identity linked to regional diversity and the status 
of  different clan-constructs associating themselves with particular economic activities 
(pastoralism/agro-pastoralism or ‘caste‘-type associations of particular trades). Space 
precludes a full overview of the Somali lineage system and how this relates to territory 
and economic activity, but it is important to note here the discursive distinction often 
made between the ‗noble‘ (or ‗Samaale‘) clan-family constructs of the pastoral 
Daarood, Dir/Isaaq and Hawiye, and the (‗Saab‘) agro-pastoralist Raxanweyne of the 
Inter-riverine areas of the South, as well as other ethnic groups falling outside of this 
broader Somali lineage system. Not being able to engage fully here with the flexibility, 
fluidity and complexity on the ground of these constructs, I simply point out that the 
HSM narrative of the material analysed emphasises the shared ‗Somali-ness‘ of the 
activities discussed, and at the same time implicitly highlights the value of impartial 
application of the Shariah in contexts where clan contestation and marginalisation is 
particularly acute.   
This is particularly relevant for so-called ‗minority‘ groups who sit outside of 
the main four Somali lineage constructs
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 and who will likely continue to be politically 
marginalised through the institutionalised ―4.5‖ clan-based allocation of positions in the 
embryonic federal system. Such issues influence possible interpretations of the HSM 
propaganda material focusing on somewhere like Baraawe; home to such a ‗minority‘ 
population which may identify itself, to an extent and in varying circumstances, outside 
of the linguistic, cultural, historical or ethnic conceptions of ‗Somali‘ identity46. HSM 
recruitment from clan groupings who fall into such a ‗minority‘ category or who are 
dissatisfied with their political share in the regional federalisation process is well 
established, and these videos, whilst not naming any specific groups, could be read to 
contain implicit appeals to particular audiences.  
That the internal coherence of HSM is itself, at times, compromised by clan-
related intrigues is undoubted
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. However, what is of relevance here is the public 
presentation of narratives of ‗traditional‘ political-social organisation alongside jihadi 
struggle. It is important to draw attention to the ways in which pro-HSM media often 
explicitly portrays the group as a mediator between or distinct actor vis-á-vis self-
defined clan-groupings, all in the context of the ongoing conflict. This may take the 
form of portrayals of HSM facilitating clan reconciliation in areas which it controls or 
announcements of  clan ‗representatives‘ support for the jihad48.  Crucially, there is an 
amalgamation here of ‗Somali‘ and ‗Islamic‘ signifiers of identity, for example, in the 
apparent application of xeer-based norms of inter-clan relations along with the 
supposedly impartial application of Shariah. These presentations gloss over the details 
of local conflict, defining a wider struggle in terms of a united and homogenous ethno-
religious community versus foreign ―infidels‖ and their apostate ―stooges‖.  
   
Conclusion  
This paper has not argued that HSM retains significant levels of popular support 
amongst ‗ordinary‘ Somalis, but rather that the discursive strategy employed by their 
propaganda affiliates utilises narratives of the historical division of Somalia and current 
exploitation by ‗neo-colonialists‘ of political and societal cleavages, that are all 
prevalent in the wider Somali public spheres of political communication and debate. 
The analysis of specific media texts has illustrated how the conflict narrative of HSM 
and its application of discourses of Somali ethno-nationalism ‗work‘ in the context of 
political fragmentation and popular perceptions of the prevalence of external 
interference in modern Somalia.  
Whilst HSM‘s moment of legitimacy and the potential for rekindling that early 
support may well have passed, a narrative politics which engages explicitly labelled 
‗Somali‘ perceptions of history and shared ethno-national identity remains potentially at 
the disposal of other challengers to existing and emerging power-holders within a 
reconfigured Federal Somalia. One should not underestimate the obstacles that clan and 
regional real-politick hold for the emergence of any such new or rebranded ‗nationalist‘ 
contenders for power, nor assume that HSM has itself managed to transcend these local 
dynamics of contestation. Nevertheless, the history of the emergence and development 
of HSM itself as a fairly diverse cross-clan and effective administrative entity itself 
testifies to at least the future possibility of this type of mobilisation, and the slick 
propaganda capabilities of media organisations sympathetic to its agenda should not be 
underestimated. Uncertainty surrounding political transition in 2016 and the viability of 
the federal reconfiguration process only adds to the potential for conflict and reversal of 
political and security progress made since 2012. Furthermore, dynamics within HSM 
itself - particularly with regard to divisions already manifesting themselves over 
potential affiliations towards the ‗Islamic State‘ and the wider international jihadi 
context – may produce opportunities for new militant actors to emerge onto the 
narrative battlefield explored above.  
This paper has attempted to contribute to a debate on future trajectories of state 
contestation in a dynamic Somali political environment by presenting a certain stand of 
nationalist jihadi discourse within the context of the wider Somali public sphere. 
Ultimately, whilst one may abhor the violence against civilians which HSM‘s conflict 
narrative attempts to legitimize, its ideological appeals to doctrinal clarity and 
coherence deserve critical attention from scholars, as well as policy and humanitarian 
practitioners working in Somalia. Such analysis must foreground both the broader 
influence of international jihadi mobilisation, as well as local conditions conducive to 
militant Islamist activism - themselves grounded in wider dynamics of socio-religious 
change, shared conceptualisations of historical ethno-religious identity, and popular 
perceptions of Somalia‘s geopolitical place in wider region and world.   
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1.     I employ this acronym for ‗Al Shabaab‘ as it denotes the ‗official‘ and full name of the group (the organisation or its supporters rarely use the 
moniker ‗Al Shabaab‘ on its own but rather ‗The Mujaahidiin‟ or Xarakaad Al Shabaab, the Al Shabaab Movement). Whilst I would otherwise 
use the Somali orthography for the acronym (thus XSM), the ―HSM‖ tag has been used by the group in the past for public (English) 
communication, such as for Twitter feeds accounts associated with its spokesmen (@HSMpress).  
2. United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Report 12 July 2013: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413  
                                                                                                                                               
3. For an overview of Salafi or Wahabi forms of ‗fundamentalist‘ Sunni Islam and their different political or military manifestations see 
Wiktorowicz (2006). 
4. Halgan.net, 9 April,2015: “Dowladda Federaalka Soomaaliya oo lacag dul dhigtay 11 hogaamiye oo ka tirsan Al-shabaab” [The Federal 
Government puts money on the head of 11 Al Shabaab leaders]: http://halgan.net/2015/04/dowladda-federaalka-soomaaliya-oo-lacag-dul-dhigtay-
11-hogaamiye-oo-ka-tirsan-al-shabaab/   
5.     Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. 
6.   Lucaites and Condit, ―Re-constructing Narrative Theory.‖  
7.  Hammond, ―Somalia Rising: things are starting to change for the world‘s longest failed state‖; Guardian newspaper, 22 January 2016,  ―Defiant 
Somalis condemn Al Shabaab beach attack‖: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/somalia-lido-beach-mogadishu-tweetlidopictures-
alshabaab  
8. 
   
Somali language Sabahi Online was run by the US Department of Defence (AFRICOM/Special Operations Command): 
https://fcw.com/articles/2015/02/13/african-web-sites.aspx 
 
9.   Anzalone et al. ―Al Shabaab‘s Tactical and Media Strategies.‖ 
10. Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia; Marchal, ―The Rise of a Jihadi Movement.‖ 
11.  See Cabdullahi Ibraahim‘s (26 March 2015), commentary, characteristic of innumerable critiques in the ‗mainstream‘ Somali public sphere 
decrying the influence of foreign powers: “Maamul Goboleedyadu ma Federaalka Itoobiya bay ka tirsan yihiin?” [Are the regional 
administrations just part of Federal Ethiopia?] Here the writer raises the spectre of the emergence of Islamist opposition ―worse‖ than Al Shabaab 
- akin to Daacish (The ―Islamic State‖) - who will argue they are defending the nation from colonialism and its facilitators:
   
http://www.keydmedia.net/editorial/article/federaalkee_bay_ka_tirsan_yihiin_maamul_goboleedyada_itoobiya_mise_kan/ 
 
12.   Alshaer, ―Towards a Theory.‖ 
13. Said, Culture and Imperialism. 
14. Bouissac, Sausurre: A Guide. 
15.
 
Alshaer, ―Towards a Theory,‖ 104. 
16. Wodak, ―Critical Discourse Analysis‖ 191. 
17. Al Furqaan Media, 22 December 2015 “Soo Kabashada Janaale”[The recovery of Janaale], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQt0hzU6Ku8  
18. Bryden, ―The Reinvention of Al Shabaab‖. 
19.    Mosley, ―Somalia‘s Federal Future‖. 
20. Adam, ―Political Islam in Somali History‖; Abdullahi, ―Women, Islamists‖; Mire Aadam, Kobocii Islaamiyiinta Soomaaliya. 
21.  Somalimemo.net, 1 June 2015, “Sheekh Xasan Turki oo Masuul Ka Ahaa Dilkii Baadri Salvadore Colombo Loogu Geystay Magaalada 
Muqdisho” [Sheikh Xasan Turki was responsible for the killing of Father Salvador Colombo in Muqdisho]: 
http://somalimemo.net/articles/2931/Sheekh-Xasan-Turki-oo-Masuul-Ka-ahaa-Dilkii-Baadari-Salvador-Colombo-Loogu-Geystay-Magaalada-
Muqdisho  
22.  De Waal, Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, 128.  
23. Barnes, Hassan,  ―The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu‘s Islamic Courts‖; Mwangi, ―The Union of Islamic Courts and Security Governance in 
Somalia.‖ 
24. Hansen, Al Shabaab, Chapter 6.  
25. Tiilikainen, ―Spirits in the Human World‖  
26. The Guardian newspaper, 2 April 2015 ―Al-Shabaab: from al-Qaida rejects to a fighting force of thousands‖:    
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/al-shabaab-from-al-qaida-rejects-to-a-fighting-force-of-thousands 
27.
 
Hesse, ―Introduction: The Myth of Somalia.‖  
28. This was a recurring theme of interviews I conducted with Somali professionals (in media, education and humanitarian fields) in Muqdisho, April 
2015. For a (rare) critique in the Somali public sphere of doctrinal orthodoxy or the restrictions of religious debate see Bashir M. Xersi‘s (3 
October 2014) opinion piece ―Wadaaddadii Soomaaliyeed ma UMAL ayaa ka haray?!” [Of the Somali clerics is it only Umal who is left?!] 
https://bilediraac.wordpress.com/2014/10/03/wadaaddadii-soomaaliyeed-ma-umal-ayaa-ka-haray/ 
 
29.   Shariff (2015) discusses the role of Sudanese Islamic higher education in training and socialising a generation of cadres who played a crucial role 
in the Union of Islamic Courts project. My own experience in Muqdisho confirms the prevalence of such alumni networks in the current SFG.  
30. Menkhaus, ―Political Islam in Somalia‖ 111. 
31.   Anderson, ―Clan Identity and Islamic Identity‖ 23. 
32. 
 
The killing of civilians in Merka, by Ugandan AMISOM Forces (see Human Rights Watch statement August 18, 2015, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/13/somalia-au-forces-linked-wedding-killings) is the latest of a series of similar incidents where 
indiscriminate fire on civilians has followed attacks on patrols. Elsewhere in the south-central hinterlands the continued presence of HSM and a 
lack of independent oversight on AMISOM operations make accurate verification of civilian casualties (frequently reported in the Somali 
language media) highly problematic. Amin Amir‘s popular and widely reproduced political cartoons (aminarts.com) are a good example of wider 
discourses in the Somali public sphere decrying this type of violence and the continued division of Somali through foreign intrigue. See Chonka 
                                                                                                                                               
(2016, forthcoming) ―Cartoons, Contestation and the Digital Diaspora: Amin Arts and Transnational Political Imagination in Somali News 
Media‖
 
33. In the Puntland and Somaliland, where political institutions are stronger, a greater level of regulation exists (see Stremlau, ―Hostages of Peace‖).  
34.  Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia; Isse-Salwa, ―The Internet and the Somali Diaspora.‖   
35. Somalia Newsroom 3 December 2015: http://somalianewsroom.com/2015/03/12/will-al-shabaab-follow-boko-haram-and-pledge-loyalty-to-isis/  
36. CNN, 21 February 2015 ―Al Shabaab threatens Malls, some in US‖:  http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/21/us/al-shabaab-calls-for-mall-attacks/  
37. Caasimadda.com, 1 July 2015, ―Daawo sawirada Al Shabaab oo soo bandhigay meydadka askarii Burundi ee lagu dilay Leego” [See Al Shabaab 
published pictures of corpses of Burundian soliders killed at Leego] http://caasimadda.com/daawo-sawirada-alshabaab-oo-soo-bandhigay-
meydadka-askarii-burundi-ee-lagu-dilay-leego/ (Graphic images) 
38. Vice News 1 July 2015 „My Journey Inside the Islamic State‟ on the location of media producers in the Iraq/Syria context: 
https://news.vice.com/article/my-journey-inside-the-islamic-state  
39.  Al Furqaan March 2014 “Qaabka Loo Sameeyo Burjikada Ceelbuur”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myCwuND-ksQ 
40.  Barnes, ―The Somali Youth League‖;  Kusow, Putting the Cart. 
41.
  
Al Furqaan, December 2013 “Bulsho Horumartay Hagar Daamadii Hey'adaha Kadib”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wblzUXC04I  
42. Official HSM decree on ―stopping of mobile internet and fibre-optic services‖ 8 January 2014: Bayaan ku aadan joojinta adeegyada Mobile 
Internet & Fibre Optic, soft copy in writer‘s possession.  
43. Al Furqaan, January 2014, “Mashruuca afurinta dadka sooman” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paE-F46oO6k 
44 . See Somalimemo.net (pro-Jihadi) Somali translation of Al Jazeera Report ―Not yet Kenyan‖, 2 April 2014 (no longer available online) 
45.   Hill, No Redress; Menkhaus, ―Ethnicity in Somali Studies.‖  
46.  Baraawe is home to the Barawani (Bravanese) people (who are often categorised amongst the wider ‗Benadiri‘ populations of the port cities of 
Southern Somalia, and are descendents of the Arab mercantile communities).  
47. Bryden, ―The Reinvention‖, 5.  
48.  Radio Al Furqaan, January 2014, ―Daawo Sawirada Kulankii Dhex Maray Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Al-Shabaab Iyo Beesha H/Gidir.(Dhagayso)‖ 
[See pictures of meeting between HSM and the Habir Gedir Community (Listen)] http://radioalfurqaan.com/?p=10987 ;   
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